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A bstract 
In so far as ivialqsia is concerned, there are certain tests adopted by the courts to determine whether the acts oj the 
employer tantamount to constructive dismissal or not. These tests are, - the 'Contract Test' and the 'Just arid 
Equitable Test or Unreasonable Test'. fiowever, courts in Malaysia have ye[ to resolve which one ojthese tests is the 
most prevailing andpractical one? There are cases that apply the former test whilst in others the latte test i.7 applied. 
This paper attempts to define what are these tests, their origins, rationale and applications in cases involving 
consfructive disn~issal and to jorward suggestions to improve and suggest the best test in determining 'constructive 
dismissal ' in Malaysia. 
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Introduction 
The termination and dismissal or workers has always been a matter of great anxiety and inevitably poses a common 
equitable and legal problem to the employer on the one part and the employees on the other. To minimize and 
prevent any inequality and injustice in industrial relations and to secure industrial harmony, certain law and 
regulation have been established. It is trite law that legal rules not only enumerate rights and duties of the 
employer/employee before and during the course of employment, but it also seeks to provide provisions governing 
the process of its termination and dismissal. This transparency between employer and employee ensure that disputes 
arising will be dealt with objectively and in accordance with equity and justice. There are various 'ever kept 
recurring' issues in employment law which deserve special attention. But one of the most important issues to reckon 
with is 'indirect dismissal' or what is commonly known as the 'constructive dismissal'. This is because the law 
relating to this type of dismissal, as far as the legal position in Malaysia is concerned, is to a certain extent still 
shrouded in uncertainty. In this type of dismissal, normally, it does not require any express words or manifest act on 
part of the employer which could understandably denote dismissal. In fact, the occurrence of such dismissal may not 
be realized by the employee concerned for it rarely involve any clear and unequivocal sign that shows there was in 
fact 'a dismissal', unless guided by the principles of law. 
The only statutory provision in Malaysia which deals with the right of the employee where there is a dismissal is the 
notorious section 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ('IRA 1967'). This section provides that a workman who 
believes that his employer has dismissed him without just cause or excuse may make representations in writing to the 
Director General of the Industrial Relation for reinstatement or other relief. However, the provision does not mention 
and define 'constructive dismissal' and its applicable test. 
Objectives 
The purposes of this paper is as follows: 
1 > T o  identify the applicable tests applied by the courts in Malaysia in determining 'constructive dismissal'; 
and, 
2) To  examine the tests. their origins, rationale and applicability, and to then propose the best test that the couri 
should apply. 
Approach 
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This paper will be divided into several parts. First, the author will explain the meaning of  constructive dismissal as  
proposed and formed by the learned judges and jurists. This would be followed by probing into the tests that have 
been adopted and applied by the courts in Mala!.sia in relation to  constructive dismissal through decided cases. The 
final part would be the c o m ~ c n t a r i e s  cn the principles adopied, and thereafter, the authors' conclusion. 
The Mealzing of Corlsfrucfive Disnlissal 
The relevant laws in Malaysia dealing with employment d o  not provide any statutory det in~t ion as  to what 
'coiistructive dismissal' actually is. The I f U  1967, the Act which specifically deals with indc~ i i i a l  relations and 
emF!oymentl, for example, has no such definition. According to  certain quarters, the labelling of  'constructive 
dismissal' is rather confusing and should not be used at alL2 It is thought that 'cons::"ctive dismissal' is also a type 
of 'dismissal'. The IRA 1967 merely provides that pursuant t c  its section 20(1), a workman or employc; is entitled 
for reinstatement of his former job if he has been dismissed 'withcut just cause o r  excuse' by  his ernpluyzr. It does- 
not specifically states 'constructive dismissal'. The full provision of  this section worth reproducing reads as  follows: 
'Where a workman, irrespecfive ofwhefher he is a member o f a  trade union ofworknlen or otherwise, considers !!?at 
he  lzas been disnzissed without just cause or excuse by his en~ployer, he may make reprerenfafions i~ ::,.-iring ro ilre 
Director General lo be reinstated in his for~r~er en~ployment, the representation may be filed at the oflice o f ~ h e  
Director General nearesr ro the place of ett7plo~~1nent from which the workman was dismissed' (the emphasize is 
added by the author) 
According to  Oxford Dictionary of  Law (2000): 'cor~structive dismissal', literally, means 'termination o f  a contract 
of  employment by an employee because his employer has shown that he does not intend to be bound by some 
essential terms of  the contract, and although the employee has resigned, he has the same right to apply to an 
employn~ent  ribunal as  one who has been unfairly dismissed by his employer'. 
On  the other hand according to Maimunah (2003), constructive dismissal is: 
where [he behaviour of the n7anagenlenr causes the employee to resign ... managemenr takes certain actions ro make 
continued employment inrolerable ... [he eltlployee can consider himself as has been 'constructively dism~ssed'. The 
en7plo)ierS conduct must amolrnt ro a breach ofconrract in order for constructive dismissal ro take place.3 
From the above suggested definitions, w e  can deduce that constructive dismissal is when an employee terrriinates his 
service (with o r  without notice) with the employer due to the employer's behaviour, action o r  non-action, treatment 
or non-treatment that expressly or impliedly shown that the employer does not intend to be bound by the contract 
entered into o r  has repudiated their contract o f  employment. 
Section 20(1) of  the IRA which states 'where a workman, ... considers that he has been dismissed without just cause 
or excuse... ' ,  must connotes the following situations: 
1) Where the employer, manifestly, has dismissed him without any reasonable ground; o r  
2) Where the employee involuntarily or voluntarily, terminates his employment because of  the conduct of the 
empIoyer which caused him to be driven out of  the employment. In other word, the act or conduct of the employer 
towards him in the course of  his employment could not be accepted o r  borne by him any longer and the conduct of  
the en~p loyer  has forced him to leave his employment. 
The first situation, it is submitted, is a 'direct dismissal' whilst the second is an 'indirect dismissal' or 'constructive 
dismissal'. What it means is that the employer has at the very outset evinced an intention to  dismiss the employee, 
subtle o r  otherwise, that finally would cause such employee realizes that he could no longer carry out his duty 
reasonably. The question then is what are the elements or guidelines that could indicate to us if there is in fact a 
constructive dismissal? 
Tlre Test To Deterrrrirze Constructive Dismirsol 
Based on the decided cases, there exist at present, two types o f  test that are being applied by courts in Malaysia t o  
determine constructive dismissal. The tests are: 
See also Professor V Anantaiarnan, Malays~utl 111dusrriul Relulionr: The Doctrine 3f Conslruc~ive Dismissal, (2000) 3 MLJ xvii, 
especially at page Iviii. 
In Ang Beng Teik v Pan O!oba! Texti!rs Hhd (Penane) (1996) 3 MLJJ 137. Gopal Sri Ram JCA said that constructive dismissal 
was a convenient label; there is no magic in  the word. In Amanah Burtier (M) Sdn. Bhd v Y'ke Chee Wah (1997) 2 C L J a  Gopal 
Sri Ram JCA added that 'no useful purposr will be served by saying 'constructive dismissal' is a mere label. I t  does nothing to 
clarify matters; on other hand, ~t causes confusions. It is better that the phrase be not resofled to at all'. 
' Maimumah Aminuddin, Maloysion Industrial R~larions and Employrneni Lav, 41h Edition, 2004, Mc Graw Hiil, p. 5 
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1 > The Contract Test; and, 
2) The Just and Equitable Test or The Unreasonable Test. 
Tlr e General Provision Provided m IRA I967 In Respect of  The Test 
There is no statutory provision that states the above tests. However, section 20(1) of the IRA 1967 states that if an 
employee 'considers that he has been dismissed without just cause or excuse by his einployer', he could make an 
application or representation to the Director General of Industrial Relations office for reinstatement of his position. 
This provision does nor provide the meaning of 'dismissed' and 'without just cause or excuse'. The meaning of these 
w-ords and sentences depend on the interpretation of the court. According to Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darbv 9hd4, 
'dismissal' means 'the employee had been driven out of employment'. The question follows that whether the reasons 
that had caused 'the employee being driven out of the employment' were made with 'just cause or excuse or not'? If 
not then, that cmployes is entitled under section 20(1) of the IRA 1967 to apply for his reinstatement. 
There are several types of d i smi s sa~ .~  These include - direct dismissal, termination of  contract of employment, forced 
resignation and constructive dizmissal. However, these dismissal as required by section 20(1) of the IRA 1967 above, 
shall only be exercised with 'just cause or excuse' by the employer, failing which the court would nullify the 
termination. 
Tlre Corrlracl Test 
The proponent jurists o f  this test advocate that there should exist a contractual relationship behveen the employer and 
employee. What is meant by contract of employment is that, the employee is entltled to be rewarded and to receive 
appropriate consideration or treatment from the employer in return to the exercise of his consideration or treatment 
for the benefits of his employer under the contract of employment. In other words, each party has duty and obligation 
to one another as prescribed in the terms and conditions of  that contract. In employment law, once the terms and 
conditions of the contract of employment have been breached, this may lead to the determination of  the contract, and 
as usually the case is, the termination or dismissal of  the employee or the worker. This termination is either at the 
request of the employer or the employee himself opts to terminate it due to the failure of the employer to comply 
with the said terms and conditions of the contract. 
Further, could constructive dismissal occur when there is a breach of an implied terms? What is the 'implied terms' 
then in the contract of  employment?. The answer lies in the ratio of  Lord Browne-Wilkinson J in Woods v WM Car 
Services (Petersborouoh) ~ t c i ~  case. He said 'the implied term or the contract of emp!oyment requires the employer: 
'...not to conduct himself in a manner calculated or likely to desiroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
conJdence and Irust benveen the employer and eniployee. 
It is to be emphasized that [his in~plied term of contract is an overriding obligarion independen1 of; and in 
addifion to, the literal terttis of contract. Furlhermore, [he breach of [his implied obligatiotl of trust and confidence 
may consist of a series of acts and incidents, some them quire trivial which cutnu!arively amour;I to a repudiatory 
condzrct by the en~ployer ' 
To illustrate this, take for example, if the express term of the contract of employment states that the employee is 
entitled to get certain payment from the employer on the completion of certain works and it happens that the 
employer fails to pay that certain payment, and this finally lead to the termination of the employee concerned. Well, 
this would certainly lead to a 'constructive dismissal' because the employer had breached the contract to make the 
certain payment as promised. On the other hand, if in case there is an implied term that the employee is guaranteed to 
receive certain rate of bonus when the profits of the business reaches certain amount,,,yet the employer only gave the 
bonus to certain employees, neglecting others out of spite, could it be said that there was a constructive dismissal 
against the employee who did not received it, if at the end of  the day, because of this ill treatment and unfair practice, 
the employee concerned believed himself to have been driven out of the employment? In this case, it is humbly 
(2000) 2 MLJ. Per Gopal Sri Ram at paee 61 1. 
See generally Farid Sufian Shuaib, Dismissal IVilhou: Jiisi Cause or Excuse: The Inrerprelalion of The Word 'Dismissed' Under 
S. 20 of The Indusiricl Relalions Acf 1967, ( 1998) 4 MLJ X I  iv. 
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opined that under this circumstance it would amount to constructive dismissal. Cases relevant on this point are 
Palmanor Ltd v Cedron ' and Syarikat Sports Toto (M) Sdn 3 h d  v Akmal all V A Lazzrus, Negeri ~embilan. '  
Eased on this definition, the test to be applied in determining the 'constructive dismissal' is the contract test. The 
judg: in Wong Chee Hong's case applying the contract test held that the appellant had been constructively dismissed 
by the employer when instead of obtaining reward for the good work he had done, he was demoted fiom being the 
Head of one of the employer company's department to a mere cinema manager, a position which he had held some 
fifteen years ago as a junior executive, albeit on the same terms zcd andi t ions  of service. Such relegation of 
responsibility with its consequence humiliation and frustration and loss of estimation amongst his fellow employees 
made it impossible for the appellant to carry on being employed under the employer company's organization. In 
other words, he had been driven out of his employment and been dismissed. 
Some judges have laid down specific guidelines to further explain the test. This guidefine states that in order to 
ensure that a claim of constructive dismissal succeeds under the contract test, two limbs of the contract test must be 
present:9 
Firstly, did the employer's conduct amount to a breach of the contract of employment going to the root of the 
contract or had he evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the contract, thereby entitling the workman to 
resign? 
Secondly, did the workman make up his mind and act at the appropriate point in time soon afier the conduct of which 
he had complained had taken place? 
Other example of cases that followed the principle in Wong Chee Hong that apply the 'contract test' are Southern 
Bank Bhd v Ng Keng Lian &  nor", Anwar bin Abdul Rahim v Bayer (M) Sdn ~ h d . " ,  Christoph Hoelzl v 
Langkawi Island Resort Sdn Bhd.I2, Rudy Darius Ogous v Ming Court ~ o t e l " ,  Michael Brian Davis v Microsoft (M) 
Sdn. BhdI4, Tan Cheng Hing v Federal Metal Printing Sdn Bhd", Kumpulan Jerai Sdn Bhd, Rengam v National 
Cited as 1978 June 9, Employment Appeal Tribunal cited from Professor V Anataraman, Malaysian Industrial Relations: The 
Doctrine of Construct~ve Dismissal, (2000) 3 MLJ, p. li. See also Woods v WM Car Service (Peterborough) Ltd (1981) IRLR, 
347. 
(1998) 1 ILR 79. See also Professor V Anataraman, Malaysian Industrial Relations: The Doctrine of Constructive Dismissal, 
(2000) 3 MLJ, p. li, l i i  and liii. 
MPH Bookstores Sdn Bhd i Lim Jit Seng (1987) ILR June, 585. 
10 (2002) 5 MLJ, 553. In this case, the court specificalIy referred to contract test to determine constructive dismissal and not to 
unreasonable test. Faiza Thamby Chik J said at page 571" 
'And, in determining questions on a constructive dismissal ... common law principles, v i q  the contract test as 
propounded in Wong Chee Hong's case, are to be applied'. 
I '  ( I  998) 2 MLJ, 599. Mahadev Shankar CJA said, at page 605 - 606: 
'It has been repeatedly held by our courts that the proper approach in deciding whether constructive dismissal 
has taken place is not to ask oneself whether the employer's conduct was unfair or unreasonable (the 
unreasonableness test) but whether 'the conduct of the employer was such that the employer was guilt;. of a 
breach going to the root of the contract or whether he has evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the 
contract' 
I Z (1 998) 6 MLJ, 162. Mohd Noor Ahmad J said, at page 168: 
'With regard to the impugned clause in the new job, descriptions, I am of the view that it does not detract 
from the original terms of employment which could have been spelt out at the inception of the employment 
had there been a written job description as the amendments are within the ambit of the functions and duties of 
the general manager. Therefore, the defendant cannot be said to be guilty of a breach which goes to the root of 
the contract or had evinced an intention no longer to be bound by it.' 
" (2000) 6 MLJ. 780. KC Vohrah J said, at page 786: 
'The issuance of the show cause Ietter was part and parcel of the investigation, and ii also gave him an 
opportunity to explain the alleged misconduct for alleged breach of the house rules, and 1 cannot understand 
how ii could have constituted an act of victimization. The show cause letter cannot amourit to a fundamental 
breach of the contract of employment' 
j 4  (2000) 3 MLJ 669. Faiza Tamby Chik J said at page 675: 
'Therefore the tests for establishing constructive dismissal is two pronged, nameiy: 
a)  is there a breach of contract, or ...' 
I5 {!999) 3 MLJ. 564. Where FaizaTamby Chik J, said at page 573: 
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Union of Plantation workersi6, Holiday Inn, Kuching v Lee Chai Siok ~l izabeth",  Campbell Cheong Chan (MI Sdn 
Bhd v Ayyawoo all ~ a d e s o n " .  
Tlle Just all(/ Equitable Test (or C ' ; ~ ~ ~ U J O I I U ~ ~ C  Tzsf) 
Origin of tlre Test 
Tliij. test was based on the statutory provision contained in section 20(1) of  the IRA 1967. This section requires ! k t  
every dismissal or termination employment shall only be exercised by the employer on just cause or excuse. Failure 
to comply with this requirement will mean that the act of dismissing and terminating the employee to be null and 
void. The employee in question may lodge a complaint and make representation to the Director General of  the 
I~dustrial Relation for reinstatement. This test has been applied in several cases. 
In Goon Kwee Phoy v J & P C o m M )  ~ h d . ' ~ ,  the appellant's employment had been terminated by the respondent 
Company on the ground of redundancy. However, this ground had not been proven and it was evident that it was 
merely a fallacy. So, the appellant applied to the Director General of lndustrial Relation that the act of the respondent 
amounting to dismissal without just cause and excuse. Pursuant to section 20(1) of the IRA, if the dism~ssal was 
mcde without just cause and excuse, the appellant was entitled to reinstatement. The DG later referred to the Minister 
and then the Minister referred to Industrial Court for determinatioii. The Industrial Court found that the ground given 
by the respondent Company was fallacious and held that this had amounted to dismissal without just cause and 
excuse. The respondent company appealed to the High Court. The High C o x t  agreed that there was no redundancy. 
However, the High Court allowed the appeal of the respondent on the ground that the respondent Company was 
merely exercising its right under the contract of  employment in terminating the appellant by giving one month's 
notice and an ex-gratia payment of  six months' notice by way of retrenchment benefit in recognition of the 
appellant's past services. The respondent company's act -;:as justified as being derived from the terms of the contract, 
however fallacious the ground of  termination on the appellant would be. Dissatisfied with this finding, the appellant 
appealed to the Federal Court. The Federal Court held that irrespective whether there was a termination of 
employnlent in the exercise of their right under the contract or an outright dismissal, such act of the respondent must 
and ought to have been carried out only with just cause and excuse. This is required under section 20(1) of the IRA 
1967. By terminating the appellant's employment based not on just cause and excuse, ie by giving reason that there 
was a redundancy which in fact there was none in order to convince the appellant to accept the terminatioi~ of 
employment would certainly tantamount to dismissal without just cause and excuse, which warrant the court to grant 
compensation in lieu of reinstatement to the appellant. 
Other cases that followed the principle of unreasonable test (just and equitable test) are Supercomal Wire & Cable 
Sdn Bhd v Aniana Devi AIP Satiavelu and 0rs20 (even though it is doubtful whether this case would fall under 
'unreasonable test' as the judge in this case had applied 'the rule against natural justice'), in upholding that the 
appellant employer had exercised discrimination in dismissing the respondents employee, thereby had breached the 
rule against natural justice when it only chose the respondents to face the allegation of  misconduct and even though 
there were also others too involved in such misconduct), Dr A Dutt v Assunta ~ospitaJ", and Ang, Beng Teik v Pan 
Global Textile Bhd, P e n a n ~  (except when the case was brought to the Federal Court, where the Federal Court had 
applied contract test).22 
'Therefore 1 am of opinion that it was incumbent upon the applicant to establish that the respondents 
committed a fundamental breach which went to the very root of the applicant's contract' 
16 fi996) 3 MLJ, 221. Low Hop Bing, J said at page 238: 
'Therefore, in a termination of service under section 15(2) there is no requirement to have an enquiry as the 
employee is deemed to have broken his contract:. .. ' 
" 1 I 992) 1 MLJ. 
" (I 998) 7 MLJ 10. 
l 9 W 1 i 2 M L J  129. 
'O (2003') 6 MLJ 729. 
2 '  (1981) 1 MLJ 304. 
2' fl996) 3 MLJ. 137. 
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Co~zclusion: Wl~icli Test Is Tlr e Most Appropricxte alzd Sl~ould Be Adopted by Courts? 
It is apparent that the prevailing test applied and preferred by the apex coun on consrructi\ e dismissal in Malaysia is 
the contract test. This is because, apan from Wonq Chee Hone. and the liks. rhere is a recsnt Federal Court decision 
of Anq Beng Teik that-reversed the decision of Gopal Sri Ram JCA who had applisd the 'just and equitable test' i n  
the Court of Appeal. However, Gopal Sri Ram JCA", B ~ o b o ' ~  zznd Farid Sufian ~huaib"  argued that the 'just and 
equitzble test' should be preferred on the grounds that:26 
1 > Before Wonz Chee Honq there wss Coon Kwee Phoy, a case decidsd b! [h: Suprsrns Court which applied 
the statutory 'just cause and excuse' test. Thus, in Wong Chee Hong, the Federal Court should not have applied the 
'the contract test' as applied in England in Western Excavatino,. In Goon K\i-ss Pho\. :he Supreme Court had 
examined in a considerable length about 'ter:r?ination' and 'dismissal' and el-snruall?. accepred the 'just and 
equitable' statutory test as the test to determine coiis:ructive dismissal; 
2) It follows that, according to the principle of 'just cause and excuss'. the court should look into the alleged 
act o r  'constructive dismissal' on part of the employer and then deterniin- ivhethsr rns dijmissal (which could 
include 'constructive dismissal') is with just c a u c  or excuse or not; 
3) In addition, section 30(5) IRA 1967 imposes certain principle to rhs coun to ssnle industrial dispute 'ii, 
accordance with equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case \vithout rsgard to technicalities and 
lega! form'. Thus, it means that the court should apply the principle of equith. and nor rssrricring itselfto the common 
law principle such as the contract test as propounded by Lord Denning in Wesrsrn Ercavarine: and, 
4 The test 'just and equitable' should be preferred because it is in congusnt  uith section 17(A) of the 
Interpretation Act of 1948 and 1967: in the interpretation of a provision of the .Act, a construction that would 
promote the purpose or object of the underlying Act shall be preferred to a ccnstruction that \!auld not promote that 
purpose or object. It is submitted that the purpose of the IRA 1967 and emplo!ment law as practised in Malaysia is to 
preserve industrial harmony based on equity and good conscience as heralded by section 30(5)  of the IRA 1967. 
It is also in the authors' view that, 'just and equitable test' would be the best tsst in dersrmining 'constructive 
dismissal'. Apart from the above grounds, the author would like to emphasize rhe limitation imposed by section 3 (1) 
of the Civil Law Act 1956. Pursuant to this section 3(l)(a), in West Malaysia the la\\ rhar shall be applied are the 
written laws in force in Malaysia except where there is none, then the common la\\ of England and the rules of 
equity as administered in England as at 7 April 1956. On the other hand, section 3 ( I )  (a)  and (b) provide that in the 
case of Sabah and Sarawak, apart from common law and rules of equity, the civil couns shall apply, provided that 
there is no written law, the statutes of general application as administered or in force in England. The application of 
these sources of law is that only those that are practised and applied in England as ar 1st Dscember 195 1 for Sabah, 
and as at 12th December 1949 for Sarawak. However, the application of these sourcs; of la\\ is subject to the 
proviso 'so far only as the circulnstances of the States of Malaysia and their rsspectivs inhabitants permit and subject 
to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary'. 
Thus, if we see the grounds ofjudgment made under Wone. Chee Hono,, it is clear thar thsse grounds were based on 
the law decided in Western Excavatino,, a case that had been decided afrsr 7' .A;,ril: 1956. It follows that the 
principle of law on the contract test applicable to determine constructive dismissal should not have been applicable in 
M~lays ia  because of this statutory prohibition. I-lowever, it can be argued thzr \vhar has been laid down by the IRA 
1967 in particular section 20(1) does not specifically mention the test to k applisd: and rhis lacuna warrant the 
Courts to refer to the law as applied in England. However, as Western Escaiatinc \\as dscidsd after 7' April 1956, 
whatever principles of law adopted in that case including the contract test propoundsd b> Lord Denning MR would 
not be applicable here in Malaysia. It should be remembered that before U.'zsiem Excavatino-. particularly as at 7' 
April 1956, neither in England was there any definite applicable test to dersrmine -constructive dismissal'. Thus, 
Malaysian Courts, it is submitted, have erred when they regard the 'contract rsst' as ths conclusive law as at 71h April 
. . 1956 applicable in England. 
2 1 See his judgment in Ang Bc11t~Teik v Pa11 Globzl Textile Rhd. Fenzn~ (1996) 3 .?\4II!. 137 
24 See article entitled: Li/l~i/her Tile Test For IJnjc/lrst 'Construct~ve'L)unrrssal in .44c!a>r:u? ( 1943) 3 .'>11J \c 
25 See his anicle entitled: Distnisscl Wiri70~1 Jusi Cause or k c u s e :  Inierpreralron o~.The !:'cjr;i 'Dismirxc.d' L'nder Section 20 gf 
the lndustrial Relaiions /Ic/ 1967, (1998). 4 MLJ xliv. 
26 See Professor V Anantaraman, ,Malaysian Industrial Relations: The Docirine of Cot:jrruci~ve Dism~ssol. (3_00013 MLJ.  p. Iv  
and Ivi 
- 
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Finally, in the event the above contention and grounds is still not enough to settle such a problem on the appropriate 
test applicable, it is suggested that certain amendments be made on the IRA 1967. These amendments must 
necessarily give a definition of  'constructive dismissal' as well the statutory test to determine it.27 
Conrments orr Rece~rt Case - A ~ r p  Bertp Teik 
It needs no reiteration that a definite test applicabie in relation to constructive dismissal is very essential or there 
would be 'chaos'. For example, in Ang Benc Teik, the lndustr~al Court decided that the test is the 'just and 
equitable'. However, when this case went to the High Court, the judge reversed and applied the contract test instead. 
Aggrieved with the decision, the appellant later appealed to the Court o f  Appeal and the Court of Appeal app!ied the 
'just and equitable' test which resulted in his appeal being allowed. Then, ai ihe Supreme Court, it ?a reversed 
again, and restored the 'contract' test adopted by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the refusal of the 
appellant to take up the demoted position offered by the respondent employer tantamount to breach nt' his contract of  
employment, which warrant the employer to d~smiss him. However, the court did not consider the chain of events 
leading to his refusal to accept the offer ie the facts or events that had caused hini Lo be driven out of the 
employment. The dissatisfaction of the appellant was that the domestic inquiry held, had not called all witnesses and 
evidence before convicting him. This inquiry certainly, contended by the appellant, was formed by the respondent 
company as a means to victimize him in order to get rid off him. Accordingly this 'chain of event' had infiuenced 
him not to take up the offered demoted position. Now, let us examine certain issues below, in order to see the 
problem faced by the judicial minds in Ang Ben:: Teik clearer. 
1 1 Can we say that at the time of  holding the first domestic inquiry, the respondent employer/company had 
breached the contract, in that the appellant employee alleged that the inquiry did not conduct itself properly? We 
could say so as there was proof that showed that there was indeed acts of victirnization on part of the respondent 
employerlcompany towards the appellant employee during the course of. domestic inquiry conducted by the 
respondent employerlcompany; 
2) Can we say that the domestic inquiry undertaken by the respondent employer/company was made without 
just cause and excuse? Similarly, we would agree as  there was proof of unjustified acts of the respondent 
employerlcompany during the domestic inquiry; and, 
3) Can we say that when the appellant employee rehsed to accept the demoted position because of his 
frustration with the finding of  the domestic inquiry which finally found that there were several 'baseless' and 
'unfounded' charges which tinally had been unduly proven, made against him, there was a breach of contract on his 
part or had he by so acting shown unreasonable attitude warranting his dismissal? In this respect, it is difficult to say 
that he had breached the contract. This is because he considered that he had been victimized in the domestic inquiry 
held earlier and that by so refusing to accept the offer, he indicated his protest against the offer. However, this very 
non-complying act of the appellant employee had persuaded the Supreme Court to hold that he was the one who had 
breached thc contract and that the dismissal by the respondent employerlcompany was justified. This is because, at 
the time of his objection and refusal, to report for duty, to the demoted position offered, he was still an employee, 
and that during the course of employment he is under a contractual obligation to comply with the instruction of the 
respondent employer/company. Thus, by not complying with the instruction of the respondent emplnyer/company, he 
had breached the contract of employment and that the dismissal by the respondent employer/company was justified. 
On the other hand, before the case came to the Supreme Court, the Court o f  Appeal had a contrary view on this point. 
According to the Court of Appeal, the act of the appellant employee by not complying with the instruction of  the 
respondent employerlcompany was justified. The rehsal by the appelIant to take up the demoted position offered 
indicated his objection against the victimization done by the respondent employerlcompany during the domestic 
inquiry. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that 'the chain of events' occurred, prior to the objection by the 
employee to take up the demoted post, should be looked at and be taken into consideration, viz - the act of  
victimization (committed by the domestic inquiry held earlier) done by the respondent employer1compar;y was made 
withou: just cause and excuse and this had finally caused the appellact employee to be driven out of his employment. 
In the result, the Court of Appeal held that the constructive dismissal committed (the domestic inquiry process was 
conducted without hearing all evidence and witnesses, which was detrimental to the ippellant's case) by the 
respondent employer/company was done without just cause or excuse. And that because of this victimization the 
appellant employee refused to accept the demoted position offercd by the respondent employer/company. 
27 See professor V Anantaraman. Malaysian Industrial Relations: The Doctrine ofCons~ruclive Dismissal, (2000) 3 M U .  U. Ix. 
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Thus, it is important for Court in Malaysia to put a stop to this state of uncertainty and tussle. Again, as reasoned out 
above, the preferred test would be the just and equitable test. If this test is applied, then Ang Beng Teik (the 
appellant) would win the case. 
References 
1. Amanah Buttler (M) Sdn. Bhd v Yike Chee Wah (1997) 2 CLJ 79. 
2. Anataraman, V, Professor. (2000), 'Malaysian Industrial Relations: The Doctrine of Constructive Dismissal', 
Malqcln Law Journal, Vol. 3 (2000), p. xvii. 
3. Ang Beng Teik v Pan Global Texti!es - Bhd (Penang) (1996) 3 MLJ, 137. 
4. Anwar bin Abdul Rahim v Bayer (M) Sdn. Bhd (1998) 2 MLJ 599. 
5. Campbell Cheong Chan (M) Sdn. Bhd v. Ayyawoo dl Nadeson (1998) 7 MLJ 10. 
6. Christoph Hoelzl v. Langkawi Island Resort Sdn Bhd. (1998) 6 MLJ 162. 
7. Civil Law Act 1956. 
8. Dr A Dutt v Assunta Hospital (1981) 1 MLJ 304. 
9. Dr. Rayanold Pereira v Minister of Labour, Malaysia (1997) 5 MLJ 366. 
10. Goon Kwee Phoy v J & P Coats (M) Bhd. (1981) 2 MLJ. 129. 
11. Holiday Inn, Kuching v Lee Chai Siok Elizabeth (1992) 1 MLJ 230. 
12. Industrial Relations Act 1967. 
13. Interpretation Act 1948 
14. Kumpulan Jerai Sdn. Bhd, Rengam v National Union of Plantation Workers (1996) 3 MLJ. 221 
15. Lobo, B. (1999). 'Whither The Test For Unjust 'Constructive' Dismissal in Malaysia?' , Malayan Law Journal, 
Vol. 3, (1999), p. xc. 
16. Aminuddin, M. (2003). Maluy~ian Industrial Relations and Ernployrnent Lmts, 4" Edition, McGraw Hill, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
17. Michael Brian Davis v Microsoft (M) Sdn. Bhd. (2000) 3 MLJ 669. 
18. MPH Bookstores Sdn Bhd v Lim Jit Seng (1987) ILR June, 585. 
19. Rimex Sdn. Bhd. V. Mering a/k Madang (1997) 3 ILR 34. 
20. Palm Resort Bhd v Tan Choy Bou (1998) 2 ILR 354. 
21. Palmanor Ltd v. Cedron (cited as 1978), June 9, Employment Appeal Tribunal, cited from Professor 
V.Anataramana, Malaysian Industrial Relation, (2000) 3 MLJ, p. li. 
22. Rudy Darius Ogous v Ming Court Hotel (2000) 6 MLJ 780. 
23. Shuaib, F.S. (1998), 'Dismissal Without Just Cause of Excuse: The Interpretation of The Word 'Dismissed' 
Under S. 20 of The Industrial Relations Act 1967', Malayan Law Journal, Vol. 4 (1998), p. xliv. 
24. Southern Bank Bhd v. Ng Keng Lian & Anor (2002) 5 MLJ, 553. 
25. Sri Sutera Travel Sdn. Bhd v Um Nusmayah (1997)3 ILR 756. 
26. Supercomal Wire & Cable Sdn. Bhd v. Anjana Devi d p  Satiavelu and Ors (2003) 6 MLJ 729. 
27. Syarikat Sports Toto(M) Sdn. Bhd v Akmal d l  VA Lazarus, Negeri Sembilan (1998) 1 ILR 79. 
28. Tan Cheng Hing v Federal Metal Printing Sdn Bhd. (1999) 3 MLJ 564 
29. Western Excavaiing (ECC) Ltd v. Sharp (!978) I S R ,  27 
30. Wong Chee Hong v Cr?thay Organization (M) Sdn. Bhd. (1998) 1 MLJ 92. 
3 1. Woods v WM Car Service (Peterborough) Ltd (1981) IRLR, 347. 
